


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MEMORANDUM FOR: DI Office Directors, Staff and Group Chiefs

FROM: Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: Implementation of PES Recommendations--
Third World Military Analysis

1. Since PES completed its evaluation of the Directorate's work on Third World military analysis, there have been extensive discussions on implementing the recommendations of that study. In addition, the Military Functional Advisory Panel (MFAP) has examined some of the recommendations in greater depth. This memorandum summarizes my decisions on the recommendations and directs some further followup work.

2. A number of PES' conclusions deal broadly with how we use our Third World military analysts and the substantive focus of our current intelligence publications and longer research papers. Addressing these issues requires continuing attention by senior DI management--by me, the ADDI, and you. My views on these subjects are as follows:

- We must be flexible in using the limited number of military analysts assigned to Third World topics and supplementing them when necessary by borrowing from one office to meet the needs of another. I expect you to make the best use you can of analysts in your own chain of command to meet changing demands; I also expect you to let me know when you feel you do not have the resources necessary to provide high quality support on all the important issues for which you are responsible. We can jointly decide whether the most appropriate solution is a shift of resources, a decision to rearrange our priorities, or a rearrangement of responsibilities. I do not want to be in the position of covering everything superficially while covering nothing in enough depth to support the policy process.
- Our current intelligence coverage of ongoing crises needs to be characterized by periodic analytic articles that deal with trends and prospects. How often we do this should vary by topic, but I expect

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offices and staffs to plan accordingly and to draw liberally on talking points and typescripts for pertinent analytic material.

- In your proposals for research on Third World military topics coming forward for the 1985 Research Program, a large proportion of the work should deal with strategic and regional issues, political-military topics, the international arms flow and implications thereof, and the impact of human and economic factors on military effectiveness. Single country and single-service studies dealing with order-of-battle (OB) information should be included only where there is compelling policy justification. (Information and analysis of OB matters can, of course, be handled as appendixes, in regional periodicals, and in typescripts.)
- In situations where the US is heavily involved, both current intelligence and research should concentrate on capabilities of opposing forces, the key variables (including US actions) that might lead to alternative outcomes, and the implications of alternative outcomes. To do this, all of us at all levels have to be in touch with others in the US Government who are aware of options under consideration.

3. The PES study also devoted considerable attention to mechanisms for training and developing military analysts who work on Third World issues. The first running of the course for new military analysts has been very well received, and it will run again in September with minor changes. The course for supervisors is being presented for the first time in early July. To supplement formal training, PES suggested informal monthly seminars on military subjects that would provide instruction and offer an opportunity for discussion of substantive issues and methodological approaches. The MFAP found enthusiastic and widespread support for this idea. I would like OIA to appoint an officer to manage this effort on a continuing basis, with the first seminar to be held in September; let PES know who you designate.

4. The MFAP identified much less support for a monthly military journal, although both the ADDI and C/PES continue to hear a good deal of positive feedback on this idea from analysts. I do not want to create unnecessary publications and will not go ahead with the journal at this juncture. But I do want to ensure that military work outside SOVA and OSWR is thoroughly reviewed by military specialists and that analysts have an opportunity to learn from the review process. Accordingly, ALA, EURA, NESA, OEA, and OGI should devise arrangements for themselves that satisfy these objectives and let PES know by 30 July how they plan to proceed.

5. The idea advanced by PES of assigning qualified mentors for military analysts has now been incorporated into Directorate policy for all new employees (see the final item under Section II of my 1 June 1984 newsletter). For military analysts, the "mentor" should be an experienced

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military analyst (from another branch or division if necessary). That mentor should stress the importance of active, innovative approaches to encouraging collection of appropriate information and to establishing and maintaining a network of contacts with military specialists throughout the Government.

6. Although PES found our organizational response to crises somewhat sluggish and the offices apparently reluctant to establish task forces or clarify the role of various elements in the DI in crisis support, the PES study was completed some months ago. Since then, the offices have rapidly and effectively taken the initiative to organize efforts on China-Vietnam and on the Persian Gulf. I am pleased with these developments and expect similar approaches to be followed in the future when circumstances indicate. It is far better to form a task force or working group and dissolve it after a few days than to take a chance on being caught short. To ensure that all involved are aware of crisis-related task forces, working groups, and informal meetings serving the same purpose, the pertinent details should be outlined in a brief memorandum and circulated to all DI offices and staffs, FBIS, the DO, the NIC, and any other CIA element that might be involved or interested.

7. I agree with PES that we need to do more in the way of static force comparisons and dynamic simulations (wargaming) of hostile or potentially hostile forces in the Third World; we should begin to enlist the help of external contractors to increase our efforts in this area. We must, however, be very selective, because we will be entering an arena that could prove very costly. As a first step, I would like ASG to develop a list of potential contractors with appropriate expertise--to include the ability to assess the impact of both materiel acquisition and cultural factors; ASG should consult the DI offices and the NIO for General Purpose Forces and develop such a list by 30 September. ASG should let PES know who will be handling this. I would also like proposals for this kind of work included in the 1985 Research Program--in the exploratory category, if necessary.

8. The roles of OGI, OIA, and OSWR on military and military-related issues in the Third World are not well understood in the other offices. Personnel of those offices should pay particular attention to outlining the contributions they can make on such subjects when they address training courses. Each of the three should also name one senior officer to participate in meetings of formal and informal task forces and working groups involving conflicts in the Third World--at least in the early stages of any crisis--and serve as a conduit via which the regional offices can seek and receive rapid, effective support. (Again, let PES know who you designate.)

9. Although I agree with PES that order-of-battle data on most Third World countries is less than satisfactory, I am skeptical that another assistant NIO would improve matters. We are, as you know, pursuing the Global Forces Trends Database project on an experimental basis, and I want to give that project time to produce results. ASG is developing a system that will permit DI analysts to access DIA and manipulate DIA data in a timely fashion;


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this will be a useful tool, although it will not improve the quality of the basic information. In short, I believe we must continue pressing for improvements on a piecemeal basis, but I see no immediate solution.

10. I am continuing to press DIA for improvements in its dissemination of the DI product within the Defense Department. I do not believe assignment of a DI officer to DIA would help appreciably. I expect each of you to make personal efforts to get your product to the people who need it, by personal delivery if necessary. I expect you to eliminate dissemination controls and compartmented classifications whenever possible, and to publish multiple versions of important papers when that can be done without unduly diluting the substantive message. And I expect you to organize briefings on important findings for key customers at both Defense and State.

11. I agree with PES that we need a DI focal point on conventional arms transfers--an individual who can maintain awareness of major projects being undertaken on arms transfer topics, ensure that all offices are aware of work underway elsewhere, and organize our response to ad hoc requests for work on complex multioffice questions. Once the 1985 Research Program has been compiled, PES will review it to identify work that is pertinent, and we will determine whether this responsibility falls most logically to OGI or to OIA.

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Robert M. Gates

SUBJECT: Implementation of PES Recommendations--
Third World Military Analysis

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